After going through this book, I believe readers can choose to go deeper into different aspects of China's political economy and how different factors contributes to foreign policy and even economic policy. The answer is both yes and no. Institutions such as this sustain the academy with their irreplaceable contributions to knowledge. Understanding how states use economics to pursue their strategic objectives requires that we first focus more explicitly on the role of commercial actors, the entities that actually conduct the vast majority of international economic transactions. The result is often struggle, incoherent or ineffective policy. First, economic activity can also generate nonsecurity externalities. Thus, these situations, in which the constant subtle thrum of economic statecraft may deliver the most value to the principal in terms of agent interest transformation, are where the author attempts to develop a broad and instructive theory of economic interaction.
For those deep in the weeds of China's political economy, the offered theoretical and academic framework is what matters and can offer an additional template to future analysis and observations. These cases range across three important arenas of China's grand strategy that prominently feature a strategic role for economics: China's efforts to secure access to vital raw materials located abroad, Mainland relations toward Taiwan, and China's sovereign wealth funds. These factors reflect the business-government conditions under which economic statecraft will be likely to succeed. The case studies used here are a little stale, but they do tend to aptly reinforce the theory. The book deals with some key cases and examples that are well publicized in the news media while providing sufficient add-on details related to the context of the circumstances especially relating to domestic Chinese politics and recent history.
Thus, the term security externalities is used to denote the security consequences arising as a by-product of economic interaction. Coercive Leverage across the Taiwan Strait 7. To demonstrate the usefulness of his argument, Norris carefully explores an impressive selection of the most important recent Chinese attempts to exercise economic power for strategic ends. Whether these security effects are intended or not also does not matter in terms of the security consequences of the economic interaction. Norris spent more than two years conducting field research in China and Taiwan during which he interviewed current and former government officials, academics, bankers, journalists, advisors, lawyers, and businesspeople. What Right Looks Like 10. The ideas in this book are applicable beyond China and help us to understand how states exercise international economic power in the twenty-first century.
To explain variation in state control, five factors are examined that reflect the business-government conditions under which states will be able to control commercial actors and thus direct their activities to generate the desired strategic effects. He presents a novel approach to studying economic statecraft that calls attention to the central challenge of how the state is or is not able to control and direct the behavior of economic actors. . To do so, I focus on the element of state control, whether the state can control or direct the behavior of the economic actors that are conducting the international economic activity. Norris significantly advances our understanding of economic statecraft as well as grand strategy. That is, the state must work through agents with the specialized capacity to actually conduct the activity that will lead to the desired national political outcome. The Challenge of State Control 3.
In Chinese Economic Statecraft, William J. This study finds that economic statecraft is not an easy lever of national power for states to wield but when they master it, economic statecraft can have powerful strategic effects. In both instances, states find themselves facing principal-agent challenges. Norris answers this question by unpacking the idea China is a monolith. Although this bottom-up approach holds out the possibility of a more fine-grained examination of the mechanisms of economic statecraft, it still lacks a capacious framework for analyzing actual practice. This is timely scholarship at its best.
Without their loving support, this work would not have been possible. As a result, the field continues to struggle with understanding the specific microfoundations of economic statecraft as it is actually practiced in grand strategy. However, he is unable to illustrate that the ban was responsible for these low votes. Norris identifies key causes of Chinese state control through tightly structured, substate and crossnational comparisons of business-government relations. The reality on the ground, however, suggests that such state control may not be unwavering. They mirror the shortcomings of the general literature on economic statecraft in international relations, namely an undertheorized role for commercial actors and their relationship to the strategic goals of the nation-state. Norris shows what Chinese economic statecraft is, how it works, and why it is more or less effective.
Whereas such breadth may present complications when assessing model validity, the potential for the theory to be widely applicable is also one of the greatest strengths of Chinese Economic Statecraft. Roger Haydon, Emily Powers, Ange Romeo-Hall, Drew Bryan who deserves special recognition for his tireless attention to detail and patient copyediting , and the entire acquisition, editorial, and production team at Cornell University Press have been terrific partners. In particular, my wife, Jen, has graciously endured extended trips abroad, weekends at the office, three household relocations, working vacations, and countless other selfless sacrifices for the sake of these pages. Moore, University of Cincinnati, author of China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era Read more. Please, or to access full text content. Despite these similarities the outcomes were different.
² To do this effectively, states must first be able to control the behavior of commercial actors that conduct the vast majority of international economic activity. That knowledge, in turn, enhances our understanding of how states in general use economic tools to advance national power. My time with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program provided the opportunity to write the initial draft of the book manuscript. State Administration of Foreign Exchange 9. In the latter, a conceptual and theoretical structure is developed and then tested by empirical observation, whereas in the former, theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality. Norris makes an attempt at a more balanced and nuanced approach to Chinese economic actors including the government.
The ideas in this book are applicable beyond China and help us to understand how states exercise international economic power in the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, sensitivities surrounding their contributions require that they remain anonymous. But we do not understand the economic elements of national power to the same degree. It neatly tries to forecast the outcome of any given interaction between corporate enterprises and the state. However, the main focus of the book is premised on a puzzle: why does Chinese economic statecraft sometimes succeed and sometimes fail? For instance, economic tools of national power can be used to pursue strictly economic objectives. You can change your cookie settings at any time. Norris provides an accessible tool kit to help us better understand important economic developments in the People's Republic of China.